No.
The cognizance of morality requires a mind able to conceptualize the fundamental symbolic semantics. Humans are the only beings known to be able to do this, so to speak of evil crocodiles or lions is a category mistake; they are literally amoral because they are incapable of such reflection.
(The whole point of, for instance, RL Stevenson's The Strange Case of Doctor Jeckyll & Mister Hyde (1886) is to make this point.)

As a scientist I acknowledge that pseudo-science is always a danger. (Aristotle famously wrote about the educated elite and their use of rhetoric —— the study of persuasive oratory —— to convincingly argue something that was not true: sophistry, from the Classical Greek ΣΌΦΟΣ denoting the perversion of knowledge and connoting cunning.)

I would remind you that there is still (despite its recent deprecation by Postmodern theory) objective truth.

Humans, being the recent evolutionary descendants of lemur-like mammals a few million years ago, who lived in small groups and thus have an inbuilt moral code (except those few outliers that we regard as antisocial and the related spectrum of sociopathic disorders —— incidentally now referred to in psychiatry as criminal and no longer as "abnormal", since normal is closer to a statistical metric than a median value for any given social construct.) Just look at how people have behaved in the last year to find overwhelming evidence of kindness to strangers.

So what you are describing is more a political morality (literally the proclivities of the many) and not a personal one.*

This is why there has only ever been one universal law, first postulated by Immanuel Kant on the eighteen century, and subsequently referred to as the imperative: human beings are never to be used as a means to any other end, even the well-being of many other humans.

This imperative is still valid.

Invoking Thomas Aquinas
That said, I would happily argue that some acts are beyond civilized tolerance, like deliberate evil acts of wilful cruelty to innocent bystanders for the enjoyment of the perpetrator. (I am deliberately using an extreme example to make the point; I'm well aware that few phenomena are so black-and-white in human affairs, hence the rich history of jurisprudence. :)
In such an instance I would have no hesitancy to surmise, should I be called to volunteer on a jury, that the perpetrator (proven guilty, of course) had forfeited their humanity (and consequently their right to protection through the categorical imperative). This is literally de-humanizing them; or, rather, completing the paperwork on their actions and concluding their fate.

Of course this is exactly the slippery slope that politicians use to justify war. (But some wars must be fought, too.)

Interestingly, Ruth Ginsburg was of the opinion that the political mess that has resulted from the US Supreme Court ruling of Roe versus Wade was more because of the ham-fisted over-reach of the court than the conflict of underlying morality.

In other words, because the court adjudicated that not only that the Texan law under review was unconstitutional, but, further, that any law against abortion was, this created waves of protest that are still reverberating around the political arena a half-century later. She believed that had the court merely struck down the Texan law, then the legal-political process would have worked out what society really wanted, rather than have an elite group of lawyers decide for them.
This is supported by the fact that pretty much everywhere else in the world there is some (but certainly not uniform) allowance for abortion —— even, most recently, Argentina, the home of Pope Francis (who argued against it) and Ireland before there —— without the continuing acrimony evidenced in the USA. So, according to this late, feted, progressive jurist, the problem is not a continuing moral argument between the extremists (they will always argue) it is instead the fact that an unelected body made a unilateral decision that potentially reaches every person.
(The USA is almost unique in the breadth of its democracy; every public office is potentially an elected office, from dog catchers to police chiefs, so that the social contract is re-energized with every election. What the Supreme Court did in 1973 has caused the ongoing political fall-out, not the decision itself; now other activists see a way to "make an end-run around democracy" and have their less-than popular beliefs codified into law through government fiat, rather than public acclimation.)

This is a very good summary.
For version 1, little explication is required; just eliminate the threat of recidivism to society with little lost in the process (kill or imprison forever).
For version 2, I would be content (if that is even appropriate under the circumstances) with the parents' forgiveness, the perpetrator's shrift, and the society's justice (including the death penalty, since the law must strive to reduce any perceived incentive to criminal behaviour with absolute punishments). Thus, the parents would be sad to see yet more violence; the perpetrator would welcome punishment; and the society would promulgate the absolute and unqualified penalty for capital crimes (i.e., transgressing Kant's imperative in the most extreme manner). Very eloquent and perfectly apt!

________
* This is why libertarian policies are superior to socialist policies, since socialism seeks to treat every member of a group (a very arbitrary political calculus) with the attributes ascribed to that group, whereas libertarian policies devolve responsibility to each individual and (using John Stuart Mill's harm principle) that each individual cannot control any other. It is politics that provides an individual, acting on behalf of their society, with a power over another; this power is dangerous (like a motor vehicle) and must be stringently regulated lest those with power use it for their own desires and not pro bono publico as they ought.

edit: updated this instead of adding a new reply. Mea culpa. Took advantage to correct spelling of Mr Kant's first name and remove an unnecessary comma from the third paragraph of the second reply.